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This Article examines how law influences social norms.  It seeks to 
understand the characteristics of law that influence opinions about the 
social acceptability of regulated behavior.  To this end, the Authors 
examined the practice of sharing digital files of copyrighted material, 
file sharing, by conducting an experiment to identify the characteristics 
of copyright law that influence perceptions of social norms about 
unlawful file sharing.  Even though college students surveyed believe 
that peer-to-peer file sharing is common practice, they thought the 
practice would become less socially acceptable if violators were subject 
to shaming penalties. They also expressed less willingness personally to 
engage in file sharing if violators were subject to revocation of university 
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network privileges.  These results suggest that both formal and informal 
sanctions associated with copyright regulations influenced perceptions of 
file sharing norms.  At the same time, law did not influence perceptions of 
file sharing norms in the absence of sanctions, nor did making salient the 
moral justifications for refraining from unlawful file sharing.  This 
Article discusses the implications of these results both for the theoretical 
debate about the expressive function of the law and the policy debate 
over unlawful file sharing. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In certain areas of life, there are many easy opportunities to violate the 
law where the resulting harm is apparently minimal; the presence of 
ready opportunity and absence of serious harm make such violations 
common.  In extreme cases, violating the law is the norm.  In these 
situations, it is very difficult for law to influence behavior.  People see 
no moral obstacle, and they notice that most other people do not hesitate 
to engage in the behavior.  Aside from the law, every relevant source  
signals that the behavior in question is permissible.  Examples of laws 
that are widely ignored include traffic laws,1 tax laws,2 and more recently, 
laws governing peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted material. 
Is it possible for law to influence behavior in these situations?  There 
is no doubt that dramatically increasing penalties for violating these 
widely ignored laws would eventually result in deterrent effects—one 
can imagine the widespread caution on the road if the penalty for 
speeding were one year in prison for every one mile per hour over the 
speed limit.  But such measures are both extreme and beside the point.  
In this Article, we address the question of whether law can shift the 
existing social norm so that people change their views of the social 
 1. See Edward Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 681-93 (2006); Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1399 (2002). 
 2. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational 
Postures and Non-compliant Actions, in TAXING DEMOCRACY 15, 15-39 (Valerie 
Braithwaite ed., 2003) (estimating that a substantial portion of the population is resistant 
to paying income taxes).  In addition to income tax resistance, the problem of sales tax 
evasion has become more widespread, as witnessed by the popularity of Internet 
commerce sites that do not collect sales tax, such as Amazon.com. See Austan Goolsbee, 
In a World Without Borders: The Impact of Taxes on Internet Commerce, 115 Q.J. ECON. 
561, 561 n.1 (2000) (“Every state requires consumers to pay a use tax (at the sales tax 
rate) for any out-of-state catalog or Internet purchases. . . .  Noncompliance is 
widespread so the transactions are, effectively, tax-free.”). 




acceptability of the act in question.  If law can do this, even in domains 
where the prohibited behavior was once widespread, then the more 
interesting question is how law is able to shift existing social norms in 
these situations.  A central idea in the literature on law and social norms 
is that law can influence behavior expressively—simply by what it 
says—and independently of sanctions it threatens.3  Several accounts of 
expressive law assume that law influences social norms by changing 
perceptions about others’ attitudes about the behavior in question.4  That 
is, when a law comes to the attention of a citizen, that citizen changes 
her perceptions of the extent to which others will engage in and approve 
of the behavior that law seeks to regulate.  This Article reports the 
results of an original experiment designed to test the questions: What is 
it about law that causes people to perceive changes in the relevant social 
norm?  Do formal sanctions cause the citizen to believe that others will 
no longer approve of or engage in the regulated behavior?  Do informal 
sanctions associated with violating law, such as shame, stigma, and 
social disapproval cause the citizen to believe that others will no longer 
approve of or engage in the regulated behavior?  Does violation of the 
law imply a moral violation that the citizen believes will change the 
prevailing social norms?  Finally, does the citizen believe that others 
believe that law ought to be obeyed, and that the legitimacy inherent in 
law will change the perception of the prevailing social norms? These 
questions are fundamental to an understanding of how law works, yet, 
somewhat surprisingly, they remain unaddressed in the rapidly growing 
literature on law and social norms.5
This Article addresses these questions in the context of one of the 
most controversial types of prohibited yet common activities—peer-to-
peer file sharing.  This Article reports an experiment conducted to 
examine whether law can shift existing file sharing norms toward 
compliance and, if so, what mechanisms are likely to cause this.  The 
results are surprising: even though peer-to-peer file sharing is perceived 
as a pervasive practice, the threat of divulging and publicizing the names 
of file sharers causes the social norm to shift, and the practice becomes less 
socially acceptable.  The threat of publicizing offenders also led our 
respondents to report being less likely to engage in file sharing 
themselves.  Thus, even though the practice of peer-to-peer file sharing 
is prevalent—especially among a college student sample—people are 
less willing to engage in the practice under a spotlight. 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
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This Article addresses the features of law that are thought to cause 
shifts in social norms and contributes much needed data to help shed 
light on how these features operate.  Identification and understanding of 
these mechanisms will help policymakers construct legislation and 
enforcement mechanisms that carry the greatest promise of shifting 
existing social norms in the desired direction.  Until now, much of the 
discussion on the relationship between law and norms has been framed 
in the abstract.  By framing the discussion around a set of specific norms 
about file sharing and employing a rich body of theory about the 
mechanisms through which law can change social norms, this Article 
presents a set of claims and recommendations that aspire to be both 
theoretically sound and practically relevant. 
The next Part provides background about the law governing file 
sharing and the evolving social norms regarding such practices.  Part III 
offers a general review of the existing literature on expressive law and 
the interaction of law and social norms. Part IV describes the experimental 
methodology and results.  Finally, Part V examines the meaning of the 
results and their implications for file sharing policy. 
II.  FILE SHARING: LAW ON THE BOOKS AND LAW IN ACTION6
A.  Law on the Books 
Federal copyright law includes both criminal and civil provisions that 
target copyright infringement.  Traditionally, federal criminal law targeted 
only infringement by competitors of copyright holders, but recent 
criminal provisions also target those who infringe for personal use.7  The 
No Electronic Theft Act of 1997 (NET) criminalizes noncompetitive 
infringement, such as downloading and uploading with no profit motive, 
and imposes penalties including substantial imprisonment.8  The NET 
 6. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 
(1910), for one of the earliest accounts of this distinction. 
 7. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry 
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 747-52 (2003) 
(discussing the theoretical justification for viewing personal use infringement as a 
criminal act). 
 8. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000).  The maximum penalties differ depending 
on the type of infringement and the number of prior offenses.  For example, 18 U.S.C.    
§ 2319(b) deals with infringement for commercial advantage or financial gain and 
provides for imprisonment for up to ten years for a second offense.  18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) 
(2000).  18 U.S.C. § 2319(c) deals with infringement involving a total retail value of 




prohibits copying or distributing copyrighted work with a value of over 
$1000 within a 180 day period.9  This threshold is easily reached by 
those who engage in unauthorized downloading or uploading of music 
and video files on the Internet.10  A copyright infringer may also be 
civilly liable for either actual damages to the copyright holder plus 
disgorgement of profits or, alternatively, statutory damages—up to 
$30,000 per work for innocent infringement or, at the court’s discretion, 
up to $150,00011 per work plus attorney’s fees12 in cases of willful 
infringement.  Thus, a college student caught with 100 infringing songs 
on her computer could be liable for between $3 million and $15 million, 
depending on whether the infringement was innocent or willful.13  
Clearly Congress views copyright infringement as a serious matter.  
Hence, the law on the books regarding file sharing carries with it 
powerful means of enforcement. 
B.  Law in Action 
1.  Extent of Unlawful File Sharing 
In sharp contrast to the severity of the law, file sharing practices are 
extremely prevalent.  The music industry contends that more than 2.6 
billion infringing music files are downloaded every month.14  According 
to surveys conducted in July 2003 by the Pew Internet and American 
Life Project,15 about half of all Americans ages twelve to twenty-two 
with access to the Internet have downloaded music from file sharing 
networks like KaZaA and Morpheus.  Despite the popular belief that file 
over $1000 in a six month period and provides for imprisonment for up to six years in 
certain cases.  18 U.S.C. § 2319(c) (2000). 
 9. Another provision, The Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), 
criminalizes the circumvention of encryption codes that protect copyrighted material.  
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000). 
 10. The Napster court rejected the argument that such activities were protected by 
fair use.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).  
Although the Napster case was a civil action, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the fair use 
defense implicated criminal prosecutions by construing 17 U.S.C. § 106, which defines 
the subject matter and scope of copyright generally. 
 11. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000). 
 12. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000). 
 13. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1396 n.204 (2004).  
Lemley and Reese raise awareness of the harm to innovation that could be created if 
legal rules found innovators liable for copyright infringement committed by users of 
their innovations.  See generally id. 
 14. See Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Co. Petitioners at 12, MGM 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125B S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480). 
 15. See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music File Sharers Shrug 
Off Guilt and Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at C2. 
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sharing is limited only to teenagers, 27% of Internet users between the 
ages of thirty and forty-nine and 12% of those over fifty engage in file 
sharing.  Furthermore, the Pew study also found that among the 35 
million adults in its survey who download music, 23 million said they 
did not care much about the copyright on the files they copied.  Among 
the 26 million people who made files available for others to copy, 17 
million did not care much whether they were copyrighted.  Another 
research firm estimates that between 2003 and 2005, the number of users 
on peer-to-peer networks like Grokster and Limewire had more than 
doubled from 3.8 million to 8.7 million users.16
2.  Harms Associated with Unlawful File Sharing 
The harms associated with copyright infringement are often difficult 
to measure.17  The music industry has blamed the recent decline in CD 
sales on the widespread practice of file sharing, but estimating how 
much of this decline, if any, is attributable to file sharing remains a 
challenge.18  Potential exists for harm to community interests if the 
unauthorized use of copyrighted material removes artists’ incentives to 
create new works.19  Some courts and commentators treat the copyright 
holder’s rights as equivalent to rights that attach to physical property, so 
that infringement is viewed straightforwardly as theft.20  On the other 
hand, some economists have recently questioned the extent of actual 
harm associated with file sharing.  For example, Peter Alexander has 
 16. See Roben Farzad, File Swappers Get Creative as Wheels of Justice Turn, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at C13. 
 17. For a comparison of the various methods used to measure the impact of file 
sharing on copyright owners, see Stan J.  Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of 
File-Sharing on the Sound Recording Market, 51 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 435 (2005), 
although his own conclusion is that in most cases file sharing harms copyrights owners. 
 18. It is also not clear how much of the sales decline is attributable to market 
factors such as pricing and saturation.  In addition, some lost sales may have been offset 
by consumers who purchase a CD only because they decided to do so after downloading 
it unlawfully. 
 19. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (arguing that strong rights could harm 
innovation leading to fewer works at higher costs). 
 20. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]aking what is not yours and not freely offered to you is stealing.”).  This view 
arguably glosses over the fact that copyright owners only own the copyright itself, not 
the work—which survives copyright expiration—or embodiments of the work.  17 
U.S.C. § 202 (2000); see also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 
1263-64 (11th Cir. 2001); Moohr, supra note 7, at 766. 




drawn attention to the harms associated with the music industry being a 
highly concentrated five firm oligopoly.21  Others have focused on network 
effects of file sharing that might actually increase the willingness of 
people to purchase CDs.22  Recently, Oberholzer and Strumpf have 
argued even more forcefully against the negative impact of file sharing.  
Using an innovative and methodical approach with real time data, they 
argue that there is no proven detrimental effect from file sharing.23  On 
balance, however, if there is an emerging consensus, it points toward the 
conclusion that file sharing does indeed impose negative economic 
consequences on the music industry.24
C.  Moral Acceptability of Unlawful File Sharing 
Despite the fact that copyright policy is intended to prevent harm to 
artists’ property interests and provide incentives for creative expression, 
copyright law does not enjoy widespread popular support in the context 
of file sharing.  There is ample evidence that many people view 
unauthorized file sharing for personal use as morally acceptable.25  The 
moral acceptability of sharing copyrighted music is especially strong 
among young people.26  The following sections discuss several related 
explanations that might account for this. 
 21. See Peter J. Alexander, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: The Case of the Music 
Recording Industry, 20 REV. INDUS. ORG. 151 (2002). 
 22. See, e.g., Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized 
Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities, 
42 J. INDUS. ECON. 155 (1994) (arguing that when demand network externalities are 
considered, copying can lead to both greater profits and social welfare). 
 23. See Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on 
Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (2004), http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/ 
FileSharing_March2004.pdf. 
 24. See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma 
of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 736-44 
(2005) (arguing that the current empirical evidence points to a link between downloading 
and reduced music sales); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C’s: Music 
Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 
49 J. L. & ECON. 29 (2006) (concluding that every ten downloads result in one or two 
lost CD sales); Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music 
Purchases, 49 J. L. & ECON. 63, 79 (2006) (estimating that file sharing reduces the 
probability of buying music by 30 percent); see also Daniel Gross, Does a Free 
Download Equal a Lost Sale?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 3, at 4. 
 25. See Moohr, supra note 7, at 767 n.165 (citing a survey of 1000 people by 
Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch which found that “59% did not think it is wrong to 
download free music online, 11% thought it was wrong but said they would probably do 
it, and only 18% thought it was wrong and would not do it”). 
 26. See Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 15, at C2 (discussing the Pew Internet 
and American Life Project of July 2003). 
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1.  Intangible as Free 
Many people have difficulty seeing the wrong of “stealing” intangible 
assets.27  In fact, 78% of Internet users who download music do not 
consider it stealing.28  Among the general public, opinion was evenly 
split in a 2002 survey: half said downloading is morally permissible, and 
half said it is not.29  In this sense, the sharing of digital music files might 
be viewed in the same way as speeding—morally acceptable if done in 
moderation.30  The ease with which files are unlawfully shared might 
itself promote a lack of respect for copyright law.31
2.  The Internet as Free 
The Internet sprang from a research culture where information of all 
kinds was freely shared.32  That outlook still resonates with millions of 
users who routinely download music onto their computers.33  By heritage 
and design, the Internet represents a particularly distributive technology.  
It permits every user in every living room to function as a mass 
distributor of just about anything that can be digitized including film, 
photography, the written word, and, of course, music.  With music file 
sharing, the technological possibilities have driven development of the 
cultural norm.  College students, in particular, have grown up viewing 
the Internet as a way of accessing things for free.34
 27. See Yuval Feldman, The Behavioral Foundations of Trade Secrets: 
Tangibility, Authorship and Legality, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197 (2006) 
(demonstrating that employees had difficulty grasping the wrongdoing associated with 
using intangible confidential information). 
 28. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the 
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 542-43 
(2003) (citing data from a Pew Internet and American Life Project poll in 2000). 
 29. Id. at 543-44 (citing a 2002 poll by Edison Media Research). 
 30. See Cheng, supra note 1 (examining the regulation of tax evasion, speeding, 
and music piracy); Raymond, supra note 1 (arguing that penumbral crimes—those with a 
high level of noncompliance—exist in many areas of life and encourage undesirable 
behavior, endangering the law obedience norm). 
 31. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 724-26 (2003). 
 32. See Steve Lohr, Ideas & Trends: The Sharing Society; In the Age of the 
Internet, Whatever Will Be Will Be Free, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 4, at 1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Amy Harmon, Recording Industry Goes After Students over Music 
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003, at A1. 




3.  Privacy, Convenience, and Lack of Alternatives 
For many, downloading files from the Internet is the easiest and most 
comfortable way to obtain music and other media products.  Music 
consumers maintain that this “convenience factor” is especially important 
given the lack of satisfactory online alternatives.35  They perceive the 
alternatives presented by the music industry as very limited, especially 
when compared to the wide selection of music styles offered by file 
sharing software.  This is changing rapidly, however, with the advent of 
digital music sales in which users pay fees to music services like iTunes 
to download music. 
4.  Experimentation 
Many consumers feel that downloading and sharing music files allows 
them to make wiser decisions about whether to purchase specific CDs.  
For some listeners, file sharing has become a way to experiment by 
trying new music without paying first.  This is consistent with research 
that claims that the decline in CD sales is attributable not to the 
extensive use of file sharing software,36 but to other factors including a 
long economic recession.37  According to this line of argument, if a 
consumer likes a particular artist, he or she will actually buy the CD, so 
the number of those who download music instead of buying the CD is 
small. 
5.  Perceptions of Legality 
Surveys of file sharing network users show that people do not think 
their own file sharing activities constitute a violation of copyright laws.38  
Prior to the recent wave of industry lawsuits against individuals engaged 
in file sharing, the assumption prevailed that file sharing is both socially 
acceptable and legal.  People reasoned that Napster—the company that 
drove the original wave of online music piracy—had been shut down 
after the record companies sued and that the file sharing networks that 
survived must be operating within the law—otherwise, they would 
already have been shut down.39  The advent of highly publicized 
industry lawsuits against individuals may have dispelled the notion that 
 35. See Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 15, at C2. 
 36. See Oberholzer & Strumpf, supra note 23, at 24. 
 37. John Schwartz, A Heretical View of File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004, at 
C1; see also Gross, supra note 24, § 3, at 4. 
 38. See Lohr, supra note 32. 
 39. See Amy Harmon, Subpoenas Sent to File-Sharers Prompt Anger and 
Remorse, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at C1. 
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file sharing is always lawful.  Recent survey data suggests, however, that 
despite the recent crackdowns by the industry, many people believe that 
individual file sharers should not be held responsible for pirating, and 
that government efforts to reduce file sharing are unlikely to be 
effective.40
6.  Perceptions of Recording Industry Greed 
One popular argument for the legitimacy of file sharing focuses on the 
high price of CDs. Many believe that the record companies charge too 
much for CDs and that therefore music sharing is justified, even if it is 
stealing.41  This view is aggravated by the fact that music consumers 
believe the recording industry exploits artists.  The following quote from 
a twenty-one-year-old college student is representative: “They’re a 
bunch of greed heads . . . .  They’ve been really fat on what I think of as 
huge profits and now they are trying to maintain the status quo.”42  This 
perception is accompanied by the accusation that recording artists do not 
get a worthy percentage of profits.  Statements like the following are 
common: “If the money went into the artist’s pocket, I’d have more of a 
dilemma.  But the companies make enough money.”43
Indeed, artists themselves seem to play a crucial role in shaping young 
people’s views toward file sharing.  People who engage in unlawful file 
sharing often point to high-profile musicians who acknowledge that file 
sharing has provided them with valuable exposure.44 It is important to 
emphasize that artists differ in their attitudes toward the Recording 
Industry Association of America’s (RIAA) legal actions and its general 
perspective on file sharing.  Metallica, for instance, has spoken strongly 
and repeatedly in favor of the recording industry’s crackdown.  At the 
same time, other influential musicians like Moby, System of a Down, 
and Public Enemy contend that the recording industry’s efforts are 
 40. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Pew Internet Project Data Memo, Pew Internet & 
Am. Life Project (Mar. 2005), http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/PIP_Filesharing_March05 
.pdf. 
 41. See Amy Harmon, In Fight Over Online Music, Industry Now Offers a Carrot, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at A1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See John Leland, Praise God and Pass the Music Files, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2004, § 4, at 4. 
 44. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Pew File-Sharing Survey Gives a Voice to Artists, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at E1. 




misguided and that it must work with the new technology instead of 
against it.45
D.  Industry Response to Violations of Copyright Law 
The industry responded to widespread unlawful file sharing by 
targeting network operators.  One popular early network, Napster, operated 
a centralized file server that directed traffic by collecting data about files 
available for sharing.  The RIAA sued Napster in 1999 for contributory 
and vicarious copyright infringement, and a federal court ruled that its 
method of facilitating file sharing through a central server amounted to 
copyright infringement.46  After a court ordered it to block access to 
infringing files, Napster shut down in 2001.47
After the demise of Napster, peer-to-peer (p2p) software that did not 
involve any central server emerged.  Instead, these new p2p services 
facilitated file transfers by allowing users to search directly on other 
users’ computers.48  In 2003, the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court 
injunction against the p2p service Aimster, finding that plaintiffs were 
likely to prevail because the service had been used exclusively for 
infringement and the company had made no effort to limit infringement.49  
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit found that two distributors that offer 
the Morpheus file sharing service, Grokster and Streamcast, were not 
liable for aiding copyright infringement because they could not monitor 
or control how their users exchanged files.50  In 2005, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that such distributors—whose software is used by 
millions of people—can be held liable for aiding copyright infringement 
because their business models depended on infringing file sharing.51
In the meantime, the industry also began suing individual users.52  
This was a turning point for the music industry, which had sought to 
avoid direct conflict with its potential consumers as it battled online 
piracy.  To advance this strategy, the RIAA initially forced Verizon 
Internet Services to turn over the names of online subscribers accused of 
 45. See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in Middle, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at A1. 
 46. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 47. See Lawrence Iser & James Toma, Battling Digital Piracy: Recording Industry 
Has Taken a Multipronged Response to Illegally Downloaded Music, 25 NAT’L L.J. C1, 
at C1 (2003). 
 48. Id. 
 49. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 50. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 
2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 51. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 52. See Iser & Toma, supra note 47. 
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illegal copying.53  Verizon successfully appealed the lower court decision 
on statutory grounds, however, setting back the RIAA’s strategy of 
uncloaking suspected file sharers.54
E.  The Gap Between Law and Norms 
It is now apparent that a considerable gap exists between the law, 
which prohibits the practice of file sharing and imposes ever increasing 
sanctions,55 and social norms, which are permissive toward file sharing.  
Recent attempts by the music industry to reduce illegal downloading 
have focused mainly on deterrence.  The RIAA has brought widely 
publicized civil actions against violators despite the public relations risk 
associated with suing one’s customers.56  Public opinion about this 
strategy has been mixed, and media attention has sometimes focused on 
cases involving particularly sympathetic defendants.57  Although it is too 
early to estimate with certainty, the music industry’s deterrence strategy 
seems to be leading to mixed results.58  Interestingly, the music industry’s 
 53. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. (In re Verizon 
Internet Servs., Inc.), 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003) (requiring Verizon to disclose 
the name of a subscriber accused of downloading 600 songs in one day). 
 54. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the absence of express language in the DMCA regarding 
disclosure of names of suspected violators precludes ordering such disclosure).  
Currently, the RIAA is using “John Doe” proceedings to pursue those suspected of 
unlawful file sharing.  This procedure is relatively cumbersome compared with the 
subpoena process that the RIAA attempted in the Verizon case.  See David Gorski, Note, 
The Future of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Subpoena Power on the 
Internet in Light of the Verizon Cases, 24 REV. LITIG. 149, 161-62 (2005) (discussing the 
relationship of John Doe proceedings to the DMCA). 
 55. See Moohr, supra note 7, at 736 (explaining that copyright infringement was 
traditionally only a misdemeanor).  Only recently has it been categorized as a felony.  In 
addition, criminal liability did not previously attach without a profit motive.  Now 
infringement even for personal use is criminal.  Id.; see also supra notes 7-13 and 
accompanying text. 
 56. See Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the 
DMCA’s Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 649, 652 (discussing the failure 
of other solutions, like technological controls, to limit copyright infringement); see also 
Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004). 
 57. See Sara Calabro, RIAA Lawsuits—Music Industry Mistakes Its Lawsuits for a 
PR Maneuver, PUB. REL. WK., Sept. 22, 2003, at 9 (describing the case of a twelve-year-
old girl who was fined $2000 and arguing that the RIAA’s strategy has led to public 
relations problems). 
 58. A Pew Internet & American Life study estimated that in the months following 
publicity about the first round of RIAA’s suits against end users, file sharing dropped 
substantially.  Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Pew Internet Project Data Memo, Pew 
Internet & Am. Life Project (March 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_ 




strategy has not focused heavily on changing existing social norms.59  
This is noteworthy given that a substantial gap between formal law and 
community norms can eventually undermine the legitimacy of the law.60  
If the law prohibits behaviors that are widely known to be common, it 
may lose legitimacy or credibility.61  This lack of alignment is exacerbated 
Filesharing_March05.pdf.  Pew researchers conducted a series of telephone surveys of 
American Internet users during the years 2000 and 2005.  The survey asked respondents 
whether they ever downloaded music onto their computers. The percentage answering 
“yes” to this question moved from 22% in mid 2000, up to 30% just before the RIAA 
lawsuits were publicized in summer 2003, and down to 14% in November, 2003.  Id. at 
10-11.  The most recent result is 22% as of March 2005.  Note that even though the 
wording of the question remained the same across time, the meaning of the question 
likely changed.  In 2000, there were relatively few methods for downloading music in 
accordance with copyright restrictions, so that of the 22% who were downloading music 
in 2000, a large portion probably violated copyright restrictions.  In contrast, the current 
availability of online music services like iTunes raises the possibility that music 
downloading in the most recent survey is lawful.  On the other hand, there is probably 
more awareness today of the unlawfulness of peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted files, 
introducing the possibility that the more recent surveys are biased downward.  See also 
Hughes, supra note 24, at 743-44 (arguing that the RIAA lawsuits could have been 
responsible for the rise in record sales toward the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004); 
Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve-Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good Targets for 
the Recording Industry’s File Sharing Litigation, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
133, 153-55 (2006) (providing a useful chart of the Pew Survey results and arguing that 
unlawful file sharing has probably decreased as a result of the RIAA lawsuits); cf. David 
Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property 
Reverse Private Attorney General Regulation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1715-16 
(2005) (arguing that file sharing is increasing because the RIAA litigation has fueled a 
technological arms race); John Reinan, 4 Minnesotans Are Sued in War on ‘Songlifting,’ 
STAR TRIBUNE., Apr. 26, 2006, § B, at 1 (discussing estimates that the number of file 
sharers has increased 115% (to over 9 million people) since the RIAA lawsuits in 
September 2003). 
 59. It did, however, trot out artists like Metallica to try to convince people to stop 
copying music. See Strauss, supra note 45; see also Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of 
Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 742 (2005) (urging policymakers to focus on 
social norms in crafting a solution to the problem of unauthorized file sharing). 
 60. Both economists and psychologists recognize that credibility and legitimacy 
are important for encouraging self-regulation and compliance. See IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 49 
(1992) (showing how unreasonable OSHA regulations discourage plant managers from 
complying); see also EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: 
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982). 
 61. See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (demonstrating 
empirically that perceived legal injustice can lead to decreased compliance with 
unrelated laws).  This idea also has been investigated in the context of the acceptable 
degree of punishment for crime.  For a discussion of the importance of an “accepted” 
ratio between a crime and its punishment, see V. Lee Hamilton & Steve Rytina, Social 
Consensus on Norms of Justice: Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 85 AM. J. SOC. 
1117 (1980); see also A. Michell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Fairness of Sanctions: 
Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 223 (2000) 
(arguing, similarly, that criminal sanctions should be proportionate to the gravity of the act 
committed).  Moreover, it should be noted that the negative effects of over enforcement are 
not related only to legitimacy; overenforcement can sometimes lead to changes in 
incentives that will, in turn, lead to an undesired outcome for the regulation at issue.  See, 
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with file sharing because its social approval is perceived as so prevalent 
that many otherwise law abiding people simply do not care whether the 
activity is legally prohibited. 
III.  EFFECT OF LAWS ON SOCIAL NORMS 
Existing work on the expressive function of the law explores how the 
law might help shape social norms and increase legal compliance.  From 
a policy perspective, the unique approach of law and economics, in 
contrast to that of the sociology of law, derives from its focus on what 
norms scholars call “norms management.”62  Law and economics of 
norms (LEN) scholars focusing on norms management have emphasized 
the proactive role that the law must take to shape social norms and 
optimize behavior with a minimum of costly intervention.  The extent and 
nature of the influence of law on social norms, however, is the subject of 
debate within the current literature.  In fact, LEN scholarship may be 
divided into three camps with regard to the relationship between formal 
laws and norms.  Those in the first category argue that using law to shape 
social norms is likely to disrupt the desirable functions of those norms.  
The second group argues that law is unlikely to lead to any change in the 
functioning of norms.  Finally, the third camp views law as an important 
tool that could move social norms in the direction desired by policymakers. 
A.  The Destructive Impact of Formal Laws on the Function                        
and Nature of Norms 
Many LEN scholars have argued that formal laws can have devastating 
effects on the content and function of desirable or efficient norms, 
including Bernstein,63 Posner,64 Brown,65 Kagan, and others.66  This section 
e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 10 BELL J. 
ECON. 117 (1979) (discussing the idea that severe penalties will be counterproductive). 
 62. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2001) 
(illustrating the “norm management” approach in the context of recycling). 
 63. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (discussing the 
supremacy of norms over laws in business communities). 
 64. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and 
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996) (discussing the 
factors that influence the efficacy of groups’ enforcement mechanisms). 
 65. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of 
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (2001) (calling for a civil, regulatory 
alternative to street crime enforcement). 




reviews some of the mechanisms suggested by LEN scholars to account 
for this destructive effect. 
Frey is the leading economist to explore possible psychological 
mechanisms underlying the destructive potential of law on norms, 
marked by the crowding out of internal and non-calculative motivations 
that can occur when external motivation is introduced.67  Frey conducted 
a study and found that residents were more likely to oppose a nuclear 
plant in their neighborhood if they were offered compensation.68
The related “fine is a price” mechanism describes a phenomenon that 
Gneezy and Rustichini documented in the context of daycare centers that 
assessed fines upon parents who were late in picking up their children at 
the end of the day.69  Imposing a fine on late parents was counterproductive, 
resulting in an increased number of late pickups.  Apparently, the fine 
led parents to feel licensed to arrive late.  In this sense, law undermined 
the preexisting norm of arriving on time.  In another study on the potentially 
disruptive effect of law, Stout and Blair focused on the negative impact 
of regulation on people’s sense of their own trustworthiness.70  They 
suggest that regulating the duty of loyalty might be counterproductive 
and offer a mechanism like the crowding out mechanism discussed in 
the experimental studies, but they focus on the effect of formal 
requirements on interpersonal relationships rather than individual 
motivations. 
 66. See Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunnigham, & Dorothy Thornton, Explaining 
Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 51 (2003) (describing the existence of different compliance styles of 
managers). 
 67. For an early study, see Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated 
Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1971) 
(building the psychological foundations for the “crowding out” paradigm used by lawyer 
economists). 
 68. See Bruno S. Frey, Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-Out Effect, in 
ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 437 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (demonstrating the decline in intrinsic motivation which is 
created by the existence of external rewards); Sandra H. Berry & David E. Kanouse, 
Physician Response to a Mailed Survey: An Experiment in Timing of Payment, 51 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 102 (1987) (presenting a real life illustration of the “crowding out” 
phenomenon); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out 
Voluntary Cooperation? (Feb. 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=229047 (arguing for the 
need of a more complex model to fully capture the crowding out effect).  But see Bruno 
S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001) 
(acknowledging that this phenomenon is still questioned by mainstream economists 
despite its emergence across multiple experiments). 
 69. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(2000). 
 70. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001). 
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Following a similar line of reasoning, Cohen discusses the negative 
impact of legality on social capital via the concept of the “Good 
Samaritan.”71  On a motivational level, he argues, imposing a duty to 
help on people with special qualifications could disrupt volunteer 
activities because people will be less likely to acquire these skills.  More 
generally, he argues that the reputation associated with being a Good 
Samaritan will disappear if helping becomes a legal requirement. 
In a related vein, Dan Kahan argues that policies can be counterproductive 
when they assume that people are wealth maximizers who cannot be 
counted on to contribute to public goods and therefore introduce 
incentives that dissipate trust.72  For example, a policy that assumes, on 
the one hand, that people will avoid paying taxes will provide an 
incentive to pay in the form of threatened punishment.  On the other 
hand, such a policy overlooks the possibility that threatened punishment 
is perceived as a signal that tax evasion is widespread.73  Because people 
resist being taken advantage of by being the only ones who contribute to 
a public good, tax compliance can therefore decrease in the presence of 
threatened punishment.  In this way, incentives can crowd out altruism 
because they eliminate the opportunity to demonstrate altruism and good 
will by signaling to others that few people are contributing. 
In a study on attitudes toward file sharing, DePoorter and Vanneste 
found mixed evidence for the proposition that formal law can have 
perverse effects on existing norms.  Among those who already engage in 
unlawful file sharing, the practice was seen as more ethical under a 
severe punishment regime, compared to a light punishment regime.74  
On the other hand, among those who do not engage in file sharing, the 
severe punishment regime caused the practice to be viewed as less 
ethical than in the light punishment regime. 
 71. See Mark A. Cohen, Norms Versus Laws: Economic Theory and the Choice of 
Social Institutions, in SOCIAL NORMS AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 95 (Kenneth J. 
Koford & Jeffrey B. Miller eds., 1991). 
 72. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333 
(2001). 
 73. A similar phenomenon has been confirmed recently in a study of attitudes 
toward file sharing, which found that increasing threatened punishment causes people 
who do not engage in unlawful file sharing to believe that the practice is widespread.  
Ben DePoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright 
Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1157 (2005). 
 74. See id. at 1151-54. 




B.  The Lack of Impact of Formal Laws on Social Norms 
There is another, less well-known, body of scholarship which suggests 
that the effect of law on social norms is minimal because most existing 
norms exert such a strong influence on behavior.  For example, in a study 
conducted in the context of environmental regulatory regimes, economic 
and normative influences were at least as important as formal regulation 
for the environmental performance of corporations.75  In another example, 
Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson76 argue that most people do not know 
the specifics of the criminal law; instead, their preexisting moral 
intuitions—not the law itself—guide their perceptions of the law.  In this 
sense, criminal law does not influence social norms; social norms and 
moral intuitions actually influence beliefs about what the law is. 
C.  The Constructive Impact of Formal Laws on the                              
Function and Nature of Social Norms 
Another strand of legal scholarship focuses on the expressive function 
of the law and emphasizes the positive effect that laws could have on 
norms.77  For example, McAdams argues that law has a positive effect 
on norms because citizens view law as information that helps them make 
decisions about whether to engage in particular behaviors.  According to 
McAdams’s attitudinal theory of expressive law, enacting law solves a 
pluralistic ignorance problem by signaling the underlying attitudes of a 
community or society.78  Therefore, people are motivated to seek the 
approval—or avoid the disapproval—of others, and the information 
signaled by legislation provides a guide for engaging in socially approved 
behavior.  In addition to signaling a community’s attitudes, law can also 
serve as a credible signal about risky or beneficial behaviors—smoking 
or wearing seatbelts, for example.79  According to this informational 
account of law’s expressive function, the legislative process aggregates 
information to produce a decision that is superior to the opinion of any 
individual legislator.80  As a result, if a legislative body prohibits public 
 75. See Kagan et al., supra note 66, at 58-66. 
 76. See John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith, & Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante 
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165 (2001). 
 77. See Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, 
Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000) (reviewing his earlier model 
and suggesting a three-fold model of the effect of legality on behavior). 
 78. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 339, 340 (2000). 
 79. See Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury 
Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 1 (2003). 
 80. Id. at 6. 
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smoking, people might be less likely to smoke publicly and more likely 
to enforce the norm against others because the process of enacting the 
legislation leads people to update their beliefs.81
Similarly, Alex Geisinger argues that law leads to “belief change” 
about the behavior which law seeks to regulate, thus leading to changes 
in social norms and preferences.82  Robert Cooter suggests that enacting 
law might move people from an inferior equilibrium to a superior 
equilibrium.83  According to this model, the law might change the 
normative beliefs of enough people to lead to an actual change in their 
behavior.  Under certain conditions, this change will decrease the costs84 
of compliance for many others, shifting even larger portions of the 
population into lawful behavior.  Kagan and others demonstrated the 
informative role of law in an environmental context.  They focused on the 
informative value of the law as the enforcer of the norms, as opposed to 
the targets, and showed how the law clarifies the boundary between 
activity which is harmful to the environment and activity which should 
be tolerated.85
Moving beyond the informative contribution that the declarative 
aspects of the law make to norms, numerous studies have demonstrated 
that the deterrence mechanism has had positive effects on the 
internalization of existing norms.86 That is, the threat of sanctions is 
sometimes enough, in and of itself, to convince people that the regulated 
behavior is morally problematic.  For example, in a correlational study, 
Paternoster and others showed that perceived punishment is a significant 
 81. Id. at 7-11. 
 82. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 35, 70 (2002). 
 83. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 
(1996). 
 84. Here, cost is considered in terms of informal sanctions. 
 85. “The law on the books . . . is a benchmark for enforcers of both the social and 
economic license. Exposure of substantial legal noncompliance is taken by both 
community activists and professional investors as a justification for skepticism about the 
environmental good faith or the competence of mill managers.”  Kagan et al., supra note 
66, at 79. 
 86. See GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A 
SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal 
Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 442, 453 (1976); Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, 
The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social Change, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 33 (1971) 
(demonstrating empirically the effect of legal sanction on morality). 




predictor of an act’s perceived morality.87  This suggests that formal 
deterrence is needed to maintain the credibility of informal sanctions.  In 
an experimental setting, Schwartz and Orleans demonstrated in the 
context of tax compliance that people in a “fear-of-punishment” group 
were more likely to feel a moral duty to pay taxes than those in a control 
group.88  Therefore, deterrence can actually enhance internal motivation 
rather than crowding it out. 
Information and deterrence are not the only ways in which law can 
directly shape and encourage desirable social norms.  Edward Cheng 
argues that laws can regulate behavior indirectly by subtly reshaping 
environmental conditions that give rise to the prohibited behavior.89  By 
minimizing opportunities to engage in a prohibited behavior, law can 
force people to default to lawful behavior simply because the prohibited 
behavior is too inconvenient or complicated.  The desired conduct then 
arises by default, and this in turn gives rise to social norms that further 
enforce the desired conduct.  Law can influence social norms by “tak[ing] 
advantage of the natural inclination to follow routines and the tendency 
for social norms and institutions to form around them.”90  Therefore, the 
scholarship in this final category generally supports the view that the 
expressive function of the law can enhance personal and social norms, 
thus increasing the legal obedience of citizens. 
D.  Understanding the Effect of Law on Social Norms 
As this short review of LEN scholarship has demonstrated, there are 
many conflicting perspectives and approaches to the interaction between 
formal laws and norms.  Even though the importance of norms is 
recognized, the relationship between law and norms remains largely 
unexplored.  One key unanswered question is how formal law affects 
social norms at the outset.  This question is central to creating a coherent 
view of the ability of law to change social norms in a desired direction.  
Without a clear account of the mechanism by which the announcement 
of a law can change the perception of norms, it is impossible to predict 
the influence of legality on norms.  This Article seeks to develop an 
account of the behavioral mechanism responsible for the effect of law on 
 87. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do 
Sanctions Really Deter?, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457 (1983). 
 88. See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 274 (1967) (comparing experimentally the effect of morality and formal sanction 
on individuals’ tax evasion behavior). 
 89. Cheng, supra note 1, at 662-65; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as 
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002) (arguing that architecture can be harnessed to 
control crime). 
 90. Cheng, supra note 1, at 665. 
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norms.  By answering this question, we can better address policy 
questions about closing the gap between law and file sharing norms. 
E.  Empirical Research on the Expressive Function of Law 
The following questions are embedded in attempts to define the 
expressive function of the law: What gives the law its expressive ability?  
Why would people care about the inoperative facets of the law?  More 
specifically, why would people, upon hearing about a new law, think 
that it is likely to influence the social norms about the regulated 
behavior? 
Bohnet and Cooter maintain that the expressive power of the law 
derives both from the state’s credibility with citizens and from preexisting 
multiple equilibria in the underlying system of social interactions.91  
Credibility, as they examine it, is based not on any moral ground, but on 
the fact that citizens historically complied with the laws.  Similarly, 
McAdams and Nadler argue that in coordination situations, the expressive 
power of law derives from law making one of several equilibria salient, 
thus allowing people to form expectations about what others are likely to 
do.92
McAdams’s attitudinal theory of expressive law holds that because 
legislatures’ actions generally represent the will of the majority, new 
legislation informs people about the majority view.93  Geisinger builds 
on this view, and argues that a change in law can influence an 
individual’s beliefs about the desirability of a behavior—drunk driving 
or seatbelt wearing, for example.94  Both authors base these accounts on 
the idea that the expressive effect of the law works through its ability to 
change beliefs about what others will think about the regulated behavior.  
It is not clear, however, what aspect of the law causes people to believe 
that most others will adhere to it. 
The meaning of consensus is not always clear in existing work on the 
expressive function of the law.  A closer look at some of the expressive 
law studies shows that they differ not only in their assessments of the 
 91. See Iris Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing and 
Equilibrium Selection (Nov. 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=452420. 
 92. See Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of 
Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove 
Game, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 116-17 (2005). 
 93. See McAdams, supra note 78. 
 94. See Geisinger, supra note 82, at 70. 




types of expressive processes that occur following the announcement of 
the law, but also in their definitions of consensus. 
The expressive models that refer to coordination, focal points, and 
tipping points argue that the expressive function of law works through 
its capacity to inform people as to how others will behave when they 
hear about the law.95  Other models, of the kind discussed by McAdams,96 
Scott,97 and Cooter,98 focus on the effect of law on the approval patterns 
of other people, such as assumptions that once a law has been passed it 
will increase their chances of facing social disapproval.  The difference 
between what social psychologists refer to as “injunctive norms” and 
“descriptive norms” explains the difference between these accounts.  
Descriptive norms are how most people would behave in comparable 
situations.  Injunctive norms refer to the extent to which most people 
would approve of the target behavior.99
F. The Current Study 
What is it about law that would cause a citizen to believe that other 
people would change their behavior following announcement of that 
law?  The social context in which most people operate limits their ability 
to confirm their beliefs about the relevant social norm.  Therefore, 
people must rely on their perception of the social norm when they 
estimate the expected social and formal costs they will have to pay when 
engaging in socially undesirable activities.  Under these conditions of 
 95. See Bohnet & Cooter, supra note 91; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point 
Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) (arguing that the law helps solve 
coordination problems by suggesting a focal point on which all parties can agree ex 
ante); McAdams & Nadler, supra note 92. 
 96. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 365 (1997) (discussing the role of esteem in social 
sanctioning). 
 97. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 
86 VA. L. REV 1603, 1614 (2000): 
Why might the Smiths revise their estimate of the probabilities of sanction 
without experiencing a change in their preferences or in the underlying norms?  
The Smiths, as all of us, recognize that statutes are enacted only if . . . a 
substantial majority of the community has at least a weak preference for the 
new rule . . . .  
 98. See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
947, 972-78 (1997) (arguing for certain conditions that should be fulfilled for the 
emergence of “perfect” informal sanctions). 
 99. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., Normative Influences in Organizations, in 
SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 195 (Leigh 
L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that injunctive norms have a stronger effect on 
behavior than descriptive norms); see also Anders Biel et al., Norm Perception and 
Cooperation in Large Scale Social Dilemmas, in RESOLVING SOCIAL DILEMMAS: 
DYNAMIC, STRUCTURAL, AND INTERGROUP ASPECTS 245 (Margaret Foddy et al. eds., 
1999) (discussing some of the pitfalls in the operation of norms in large scale contexts). 
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uncertainty, it is important to understand both how law affects norms 
and how people believe a particular law will affect norms. 
Therefore, this Article focuses on the effect of law on beliefs about the 
social norm of the regulated behavior instead of the previous approaches 
of either: (1) exploring the effect of law on norms by measuring 
behavioral change across different times and different places, as in 
classical law and society studies;100 or (2) examining the effect of laws 
on behavior in coordination game settings, as in certain law and economics 
studies.101  This experiment examines why the law leads to changes in 
perceptions about social norms.  Because people are unlikely to accurately 
attribute their reasons for changing their views about social norms upon 
learning that a given behavior is illegal, this study did not pose that 
question directly.  Instead, it varied, one at a time, the salience of several 
features of law that might influence perceptions of the relevant social 
norm.  Examining various perceptions of social norms associated with 
different features of law creates a better understanding of the mechanism 
by which law influences perceptions of the relevant social norms. 
Following the widely recognized taxonomies of individual motivation 
to follow the law, as discussed in LEN scholarship,102 psychology,103 and 
political science,104 and the leading models discussed in the expressive 
law scholarship, this study explores potential explanations for why, upon 
learning about a law, people would perceive others to be likely to obey 
it.  It further examines which of the leading mechanisms will have the 
strongest effect in the context of copyright law insofar as it regulates file 
sharing. 
 100. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: 
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992) (analyzing 
the effect of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on organizational norms and describing how state 
laws have been converted into organizational norms). 
 101. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
 102. See Cooter, supra note 77, at 20-21 (discussing the interaction of expression, 
deterrence, and internalization with promulgation of a law). 
 103. See John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in 
STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER 150, 155-56 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959) (suggesting a five- 
fold taxonomy of the factors that affect the ability of a social source to influence people); 
Herbert C. Kelman, Processes of Opinion Change, 25 PUB. OPINION Q. 57, 62-66 (1961) 
(suggesting a three-stage model of social influence); June Louin Tapp & Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 89, 91-92 (June Louin Tapp 
& Felice J. Levine eds., 1977) (suggesting a three-fold taxonomy of individuals based on 
their motivation to comply with the law). 
 104. See Kagan et al., supra note 66, at 53. 




The fact that file sharing is so widespread allows us to examine 
questions about the effect of law on social norms that cannot be easily 
examined otherwise.  Music file sharing is relevant and salient to the 
college student population that was the object of the study.  Second, file 
sharing is a practice where one can expect meaningful variation in the 
responses of college students, unlike the crimes of homicide, robbery, or 
embezzlement.  Also, unlike these crimes, file sharing is a practice 
where social desirability is less likely to prevent participants from giving 
honest answers.  Finally, file sharing is a timely issue. 
The experiment considered four possible mechanisms for the effect of 
law on perceptions of the social norm: 
Proposition I (The Citizenship Proposition): Simply making the 
legal rule itself salient is sufficient to change views about file sharing 
norms.  This could be true because people think that others believe the 
law should be obeyed.105  In this account, people reason that others pay 
attention to and obey law simply because the law deserves obedience 
and deference.  If a new law says that file sharing is prohibited, people 
will assume that others will defer to it simply because of its status as 
law. 
Proposition II (The Formal Sanctions Proposition): Making the 
legal rule salient is sufficient to change views of file sharing norms to 
the extent that the formal sanctions associated with law are also made 
salient.  This proposition is consistent with virtually all accounts of 
deterrence theory, such as Bentham,106 Becker,107 and Paternoster and 
others.108  This proposition is also consistent with the view that people 
assume others obey the law because they are deterred by the risk of 
punishment.109
Proposition III (The Informal Sanctions Proposition): Making the 
legal rule salient is sufficient to change views of file sharing norms to 
the extent that the law can facilitate the imposition of social costs on 
transgressors.  This is consistent with the work of scholars who 
emphasize the importance of law in facilitating esteem110 and shame.111
 105. See Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey 
Evidence, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 427 (1977) (arguing that most Americans obey the law 
simply because they believe that the law should be obeyed). 
 106. See 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 86-91 (1962). 
 107. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169 (1968), for the classical model of deterrence. 
 108. See Paternoster et al., supra note 87. 
 109. See Catherine A. Sanderson & John M. Darley, “I Am Moral, but You Are 
Deterred”: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law, 32 J. APPL. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 375 (2002). 
 110. See McAdams, supra note 96; see also Chaim Fershtman & Yoram Weiss, 
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Proposition IV (The Morality Proposition): Making the legal rule 
salient is sufficient to change views of file sharing norms, so long as the 
law represents values that correspond to moral values, and those moral 
values are made salient.  This proposition is consistent with the work of 
Schwartz and Orleans,112 and Tyler.113
IV.  METHODOLOGY 
General theoretical questions regarding the expressive function of the 
law and specific questions regarding the effect of law on file sharing 
norms are both ripe for empirical investigation.  This Article reports the 
results of an original experimental survey.  This method has the advantage 
of permitting strong causal inferences about the relationship between 
law and social norms that are the subject of the inquiry.  Specifically, by 
varying the salience of various legal characteristics—such as 
underlying moral justifications, sanctions imposed on violators, and 
perceived legitimacy—while keeping other information constant, the 
study facilitates strong causal claims about how different characteristics 
of law influence social norms.  After presenting the legal frame, we 
measured the effect of variation on both perceived social norms about 
file sharing and the subjects’ own intention to share files.  This 
methodology also benefits from its focus on unlawful music file sharing.  
Unlike many experiments that use abstract questions or stylized games, 
it uses detailed vignettes about a subject with which our sample of 
college students was very familiar.114
Why Do We Care What Others Think About Us?, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 67, at 133 (formal analysis of personal quests for status); Dan 
M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 
(1997). 
 111. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A 
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999); 
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996) 
(advocating shaming penalties in some circumstances to reduce criminal activity). 
 112. Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 88. 
 113. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-7 (1990) (arguing that care 
for procedural fairness is one of the main motivations underlying lawful behavior). 
 114. Scenario methods, like this one, are limited because they do not measure actual 
behavior.  Of course, measuring unlawful behavior is difficult in any context.  To the 
extent that one can measure it using existing datasets, such as estimates of the numbers 
of files unlawfully shared during a given time period, one necessarily sacrifices the 
ability to make strong causal inferences. 
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A.  Procedure 
Two hundred and forty undergraduate students at a large public 
university in the United States participated in the study.  Students 
completed questionnaires in class and received a small bag of candy for 
their participation.  At the top of the first page of the questionnaire, 
students were explicitly told that their responses would remain strictly 
anonymous.  Names of students were not collected; the questionnaire 
was administered in a large classroom, and participation was voluntary; 
no record was kept of who participated and who did not.  Given the 
dominance of this age group in unlawful file sharing, the use of college 
students is natural.  The Authors do not claim, however, that this sample 
is representative of the general population. 
The legal frame was varied by randomly dividing the sample into five 
equal subgroups and making controlled changes to the descriptions of 
the scenario presented to the participants. Specifically, the experiment 
contrasted two minimal frames in which law is either: (1) not mentioned 
at all (Control); or (2) mentioned only in the abstract (Law Only), with 
three different frames which presented a specific set of formal sanctions, 
informal sanctions, or moral justifications associated with the law.  Each 
participant read only one of the versions described below. 
1. Control Group: The Control group received the following 
instructions: 
We are interested in examining students’ attitudes regarding file-sharing and 
downloading the creative work of others (e.g., music) without permission.  You 
might be asked to answer questions about future behavior of other students, that 
you do not have personal knowledge about, and we would like you to take your 
best guess.  Because we are collecting data from many students, we are simply 
interested in your overall estimations. 
2. Law Only Group: In addition to the instructions given to the 
Control group, the Law Only group received the following instructions: 
You are told that the following statement will be sent via email and snail mail to 
all registered students, staff members, and faculty members at UC Berkeley, 
prior to January 1, 2004: 
The University of California, as part of the higher-education community, must 
strike a balance between the interests of the academic community in using the 
full capabilities of technology for lawful purposes, and the interests of creators 
and licensors of intellectual property in protecting their works from 
unauthorized use, copying, and distribution.  The University of California 
requires everyone in its community to abide by the network use policies and 
COMPLY WITH COPYRIGHT LAW. Copying or sharing music or other copyrighted 
material, including software, without a permissible copyright defense, such as 
Fair Use, or a valid license, IS A VIOLATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS WELL AS 
UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS. 
FELDMAN-NADLER POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC 11/9/2006  3:14 PM 
[VOL. 43: 577, 2006]  The Law and Norms of File Sharing 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 603 
3.  Formal Sanctions Group: In addition to the instructions given to 
the Law Only group, the Formal Sanctions group was instructed as 
follows: 
As of spring 2004, any member of the University community who copies or 
shares music or other copyrighted material without a valid license or 
permission, shall be subject to the following: 
1. First offense: warning only 
2. Second offense: 30 day suspension of all University Network  
 privileges, including email 
3. Third offense: 
a. For students, one semester leave of absence, during which all  
 University privileges are suspended, and no course credit can  
 be earned 
 b. For faculty and staff, one semester leave of absence without  
  pay, during which all University privileges are suspended 
4. Fourth offense: permanent separation from the University. 
Violators shall be served with formal notice of each violation observed 
4. Informal Sanctions Group: In addition to the instructions given to 
the Law Only group, the Informal Sanctions group received the 
following instructions: 
As of Spring 2004, any member of the University community who copies or 
shares music or other copyrighted material without a valid license or 
permission, shall be subject to the following: 
1. Violators shall be served with formal notice of each violation observed. 
2. Each week, the University will publish on its website the names  
 of community members who were found to be in violation of  
 University regulations regarding the use of copyrighted work. 
3. The Web page containing names of violators will be accessible  
 to the public. 
5. Moral Duty Group: In addition to the instructions given to the 
Law Only group, the moral duty group received the following 
instructions: 
It is important to recognize that the activities of community members who 
violate the University’s copyright regulations harm the University community at 
large. The University networks at times have been slowed to a crawl by the high 
volume of music and other large files constantly downloaded. This crippling of 
our networks directly compromises the University’s ability to maintain 
excellence in teaching and research. 
Moreover, file-sharing and downloading of creative work of others without 
valid license undermines the abilities of artists to enjoy the fruits of their labor. 
It is the university position that such practice is as morally problematic as 
walking into a music store and walking out with a CD without paying. 




Community members are therefore urged to refrain from engaging in unlawful 
file sharing activity that compromises the University’s networks and harms 
talented young artists. 
Following the presentation of the scenario, the study measured the 
participants’ responses as discussed below.  
B.  Measures115
After reading one of the legal frames discussed above, participants 
answered a questionnaire.  All questions about future attitudes and 
behavior were framed according to the likelihood of the event in 
question occurring anytime within the next calendar year.  The questions 
covered five categories. 
1. Descriptive norm (Perception That Others Share Files) measured 
the extent to which the specific legal frame influenced the perception of 
the prevalence of file sharing among other students, both in terms of the 
estimated proportion of students who engage in file sharing and the 
estimated number of songs that other students download from the 
Internet.116 
2. Injunctive norm (Perception That Others Approve) measured the 
extent to which the specific legal frame influenced perceptions that other 
students would think file sharing was appropriate and that parents and 
professors would approve of the participant’s own file sharing 
behavior.117
3. Willingness to express disapproval toward violators measured the 
extent to which the specific legal frame influenced participants’ 
willingness to express disapproval directly to other students who 
download music and the extent to which they would engage in such 
forms of social sanctioning.118
 115. Excerpts from the questionnaires with the full text of the items appear in the 
Appendix. 
 116. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the three 
questions appearing under the Descriptive Norm section in the Appendix.  These three 
questions appeared to reliably measure the underlying construct of “descriptive norm”  
Cronbach’s Alpha = .80. Cronbach’s Alpha measures the internal consistency of a set of 
items, and ranges between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consistency. 
See RICK H. HOYLE, ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 83-84 (7th ed. 
2002).
 117. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the five 
questions appearing under the Injunctive Norm section in the Appendix.  Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .62.  Note that questions two through five were reverse coded to remain 
consistent with the Descriptive Norm variable, where more file sharing corresponds to a 
higher score; similarly here, more approval for file sharing corresponds to a higher score. 
 118. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the two 
questions appearing under the Willingness to Punish section in the Appendix.  
Cronbach’s Alpha = .81. 
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4. Own intention to share files measured the extent to which the 
specific legal frame influenced participants’ perceptions about the 
likelihood that they would share music files with their friends, the 
likelihood they would download music themselves, and the number of 
songs they would download.119
5. Moral norm measured the extent to which the specific legal frame 
influenced participants’ perceptions about how guilty they would feel 
about sharing files, their moral obligation to abstain from downloading 
music, and their sense of the wrongfulness of file sharing.120
C.  Results 
The experiment tested whether the legal frame presented (Control, 
Law Only, Formal Sanctions, Informal Sanctions, or Morality) influenced 
participants’ perceptions of various file sharing norms and behavioral 
intentions, measured by the five variables just discussed.  Overall, the 
legal frame had a statistically significant effect on these five dependent 
measures as a group.121  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for each 
group, and the following section discusses the results for each measured 
variable. 
1. The Effect of the Legal Frame on the Descriptive Norm                    
(Perception That Others will Share Files) 
We first examined whether the legal frame changed perceptions of the 
extent to which other students will share files, and found that the legal 
frame did in fact have an overall effect on the descriptive norm.122  On 
the one hand, presenting a legal frame (Law Only, Formal Sanctions, 
 119. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the three 
questions appearing under the Intention section in the Appendix.  Cronbach’s Alpha = 
.84. 
 120. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the three 
questions appearing under the Morality section in the Appendix.  Question 1 was reverse 
coded.  Cronbach’s Alpha = .77. 
 121. F(20, 904) = 2.11; p<.01, η2 = .045.  The analysis used a multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA), a statistical technique for assessing the simultaneous effect of 
an independent variable on two or more dependent criterion variables.  See JAMES H. 
BRAY & SCOTT E. MAXWELL, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 7-8 (1985).  
Throughout this Article “p” refers to the probability of finding a difference or 
relationship between groups as large as that observed if there were, in fact, no difference 
or relationship between them.  “η2” is a measure of the difference between groups. 
 122. F(4, 227) = 2.75; p < .05; η2 = .046. 




Informal Sanctions, or Morality) did not change the descriptive norm 
relative to presenting no legal frame at all (Control).  On the other hand, 
presenting the Formal Sanctions or Informal Sanctions frames decreased 
the perception that others would engage in file sharing, relative to 
presenting the Law Only frame. In other words, compared to simply 
stating that file sharing is against the law, announcing the prospect of 
concrete punishment, such as losing network privileges, or being 
publicly shamed, such as having one’s name posted on a website, led to 
perceptions that unlawful file sharing behavior would decrease. 
2. The Effect of the Legal Frame on the Injunctive Norm                   
(Perception That Others Will Approve of Sharing Files) 
The legal frame did in fact have an overall effect on the injunctive 
norm—the perception that others will approve of sharing files.123  As 
with the descriptive norm results just discussed, presenting any legal 
frame did not change the injunctive norm relative to the Control.  At the 
same time, presentation of the Informal Sanctions legal frame, in which 
violators face publication of their names, seemed to influence the 
injunctive norm most distinctly.  Relative to the Law Only frame, the 
Informal Sanctions frame decreased perceptions that other students 
would approve of file sharing. 
3. The Effect of the Legal Frame on Willingness to Express            
Disapproval Toward Violators 
The legal frame caused an overall change in the extent to which 
students report that they would be willing to express disapproval toward 
others who share files unlawfully.124  It is first worth observing that 
respondents were generally unwilling to confront a fellow student about 
file sharing—the mean response in all groups was less than three out of 
ten, where ten represents “very likely.”  A clear pattern of differences 
between groups emerges, however, where students presented with the 
Informal Sanctions legal frame reported being more willing to express 
disapproval toward violators than students in any other group.  Thus, it 
appears that awareness of possible publication of violators’ names 
increases the reported willingness to confront violators directly and 
express disapproval. 
 123. F(4, 227) = 3.16; p < .05; η2 = .053. 
 124. F(4, 227) = 3.67; p < .01; η2 = .061. 
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4. The Effect of the Legal Frame on Intention to Share Files 
The legal frame changed overall self-reported intentions to share 
files.125  Specifically, Formal Sanctions had a deterrent effect that 
decreased students’ own willingness to share files relative to the Control 
frame or the Law Only frame. 
5. The Effect of the Legal Frame on Moral Norms Against File Sharing 
 There was no overall effect of the Law Only frame on moral norms 
against file sharing.126 































Mean     (SD) 
Moral Norm 




Mean     (SD) 
Control 
Group 
7.19a,b    (2.05) 7.24a,b  (1.50) 2.11a    (1.74) 6.61a    (2.27) 3.90     (2.55) 
Law Only 
Group 








6.57b    (2.29) 6.78a    (1.64) 2.88b    (2.11) 5.50a,b    (2.67) 4.28     (2.33) 
Morality 
Group 
7.55a    (1.70) 7.29a,b  (1.31) 1.87a    (1.03) 5.99a,b    (3.16) 4.46     (2.32) 
Means without shared subscripts denote differences within a column at p<.05.  That is, within a 
column, numbers with different subscripts are statistically different from one another; those with 
identical subscripts are statistically indistinguishable.  All column heading constructs were 
measured on ten point scales with a higher value indicating stronger endorsement of the construct.  
SD refers to standard deviation. 
 
 125. F(4, 227) = 2.54; p < .05; η2 = .043. 
 126. F(4, 227) = 1.01; p = .41. 
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V.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  No Observed Effect of Law Alone 
The experiment showed no evidence of an effect of expressive law on 
any of the dependent measures.  That is, relative to the Control frame, 
simply reminding people that file sharing is a violation of both copyright 
law and university regulations had no measurable effect on the perceived 
prevalence of file sharing, the perceived approval for file sharing,  
people’s own intention to file share or express disapproval toward file 
sharers, or moral attitudes toward file sharing.  Simply announcing the 
law was not enough to shift either perceptions of norms or intentions.  
Note, however, that the experiment did not test theories of expressive 
law based on the idea that law works by announcing something other 
than the status quo.  Many theories of expressive law posit that a new 
law might have the effect of changing the norm precisely because the 
law announces a change from the status quo.  This announced change in 
law in turn changes beliefs about the likelihood that others would 
approve of the prohibited conduct.  The study, on the other hand, did not 
announce the passage of a new law—merely new university regulations 
that prohibited already illegal behavior.  It is possible that many accounts 
of expressive law would not predict any change in perceived norms—
either descriptive or prescriptive—in our experimental situation because 
the announced regulations were simply reinforcing existing law and 
would not give rise to a reassessment of social pressure to refrain. 
In addition, the experiment tested one specific law that is atypical—
file sharing, where prohibitions are notoriously disobeyed.  Nonetheless, 
the results suggest that in the context of file sharing, the salience of 
existing copyright law by itself cannot lead to any expressive change 
when people are not reminded of its ability to impose cost and 
internalization functions. 
In some sense, the overall pattern of these findings is quite consistent 
with theories of expressive law that posit the influence of an announced 
change in law on norms and behavior.  Note that the two legal frames 
that exerted the most consistent effects on norms and intentions were 
Formal Sanctions and Informal Sanctions.  These were also the only two 
frames that announced a change in law.  The other legal frames—Law 
Only and Morality—simply highlighted existing law.  Of course, the 
Formal and Informal Sanctions frames also introduced new sanctions, so 
it is impossible to separate the effects of deterrence from the effects of 
legal expression.  The more important point, however, is that simply 
highlighting an already existing law, as in the Law Only frame, did not 
appear to change perceived norms or behavioral intentions. 
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B.  The Effect of Sanctions 
1. The Effect of Sanctions on the Descriptive Norm 
The two most influential legal frames for both norms and behavioral 
intentions were the threats of Formal Sanctions and Informal Sanctions.  
Compared to highlighting the law alone, the perceived prevalence of file 
sharing decreased only when the threat of formal punishment, such as 
expulsion from the university, or informal punishment through shaming, 
such as publicizing names on a website, loomed large.  This finding 
implies that law might have the ability to shift or strengthen existing 
descriptive norms by imposing costs.127  A demonstrated relationship 
between threatened sanctions and perceived prevalence would support 
accounts of expressive law that emphasize the ability to increase the 
price of noncompliance.128
2. The Effect of Sanctions on the Injunctive Norm 
Besides effects on descriptive norms, the study showed that the threat 
of informal sanctions influenced the injunctive norm by enhancing 
perception that other students view file sharing as unacceptable.  This 
finding is consistent with accounts of expressive law which specify a 
central role for informal sanctions.129  In our study, the explicit informal 
sanction—publicizing on a public website the name of each person 
caught violating the law—led to the perception of increased social 
disapproval for file sharing itself.  In other words, announcing that 
names of copyright violators would be publicized led people to expect 
both that the consensus about file sharing would change and that social 
approval of the practice would decline.  The announcement of this 
sanction may have carried an implicit message that the underlying 
behavior is socially inappropriate which led to a change in the perceived 
social approval of file sharing. 
 127. Other scholars argue, however, that when the costs become too severe, there 
can be a backlash where the perceived prevalence of file sharing begins to increase, at 
least among law abiders.  See Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 73, at 1147. 
 128. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Cooter, supra note 98; McAdams, supra note 96 (arguing for a model of 
social norms based on competition for esteem). 




3. The Effect of Sanctions on the Willingness to                                       
Express Disapproval of Violators  
 
According to scholars such as Cooter130 and Axelrod,131 the willingness 
of people to enforce norms is the only mechanism that can ensure a 
stable decentralized system of governance.132  In our experiment, the 
Informal Sanctions legal frame increased the likelihood that people 
would be willing to express disapproval directly to others who share 
files; neither Morality, Formal Sanctions, nor Law Only increased 
participants’ willingness to punish others who share files.  Therefore, 
publicizing the names of copyright violators made people more willing 
both to openly disapprove of file sharing practices and to impose 
sanctions against violators.  Assuming that our participants perceived the 
publication as associated with shame, these findings support the idea 
that, in some situations, shaming sanctions are likely to deter behavior, 
which is consistent with legal scholars who argue that shaming can 
complement other sanctions for purposes of enforcement.133
4. The Effect of Sanctions on Intention to Share Files 
The Formal Sanctions legal frame led to a significant decrease in the 
individual’s self-reported intention to share files.  The ability of formal 
sanctions—such as expulsion from the university—to effect compliance 
with the law is consistent, of course, with any standard account of 
deterrence.  The Informal Sanctions legal frame did not have an observable 
effect on intentions to comply with the law, contrary to other studies that 
emphasize the importance of social approval on compliance.134  Note, 
however, that unlike prior studies, the social sanctions in this experiment 
were not decentralized.  Prior studies have examined the effect of 
preexisting, naturally occurring social sanctions and their relationship to 
self-reported compliance with the law.  This experiment attempted to 
 130. See Cooter, supra note 98, at 969 (“Effective sanctions lead to successful 
social norms, whereas ineffective sanctions cause norms to fail.”). 
 131. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) 
(demonstrating the efficacy of “TIT FOR TAT” strategy). 
 132. This refers to norms that govern behavior without state intervention. See 
Kahan & Posner, supra note 111 (discussing the efficiency of non-legal sanctions); see 
also Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 
(2002) (examining willingness to engage in costly punishing behavior). 
 133. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999) 
(demonstrating, through the phenomenon of “date rape,” the need for shaming sanctions 
to define the border between sex and rape). 
 134. See Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant 
Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
837 (1990), for caveats in the traditional deterrence model. 
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facilitate the imposition of social costs by announcing sanctions that 
would publicize the names of violators.  Presumably, people perceive 
identification of a person as a violator as generating social costs like 
shame.135  Although both this experiment136 and prior studies report that 
the file sharing norm is deeply entrenched, shaming nonetheless seems 
effective for changing the perception of the norm and increasing 
willingness to socially sanction violators.137  Thus, even when violating 
the law seems to be a very common practice, people still did not want 
their identity exposed and were willing to socially sanction others when 
the authorities stigmatized such behavior. 
The law influenced perceptions of the file sharing norm when 
sanctions were made salient but not when law alone was made salient.  
This reinforces that, to some degree, the law derives its ability to change 
perceptions of social norms from its ability to impose costs, either formal 
or informal.  These findings are consistent with previous empirical work 
showing that the influence of law on moral beliefs is sometimes 
moderated by the perceived likelihood of formal sanctions.138  Citizens 
see laws that impose neither formal nor informal sanctions as lacking 
credibility, and their enactment might lead to unanticipated results.  
Therefore, the expressive function of the law does not always function as 
an independent mechanism. 
C.  The Unique Context of File Sharing 
Using a specific law helps illuminate how citizens respond to 
regulation of specific forms of intellectual property—an important 
problem for those industries that hope to protect their intellectual 
property rights.  On the other hand, caution is warranted in the extent to 
which one should generalize from file sharing to other practices that law 
seeks to regulate.  File sharing restrictions are unusual due to the degree 
 135. Note that the specter of having one’s name publicized might also lead one to 
estimate that the chances of being caught and punished formally will increase because 
publication would assist authorities in identifying violators, leading people to be less 
likely to share copyrighted files. 
 136. In this study, the students sampled believed that a majority of students shared 
files. 
 137. See Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Shame: Why More 
Shaming May Deter Less (2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=789244  
(demonstrating, using formal modeling, that policymakers should not shame too many 
individuals to avoid a reduction in the effectiveness of that shaming penalty). 
 138. See Paternoster et al., supra note 87. 




that people violate them.  In this case, the law does not enjoy much 
legitimacy, does not seem to widely represent moral values, and does not 
seem to enjoy much credibility or compliance.  It is therefore possible 
that the attempts to measure the effects of expressive law in the Law 
Only or Morality legal frames did not succeed because the law in 
question does not enjoy widespread legitimacy.  Therefore, these results 
should not suggest that expressive law in general is largely based on the 
ability of the law to impose social and formal sanctions.139  These 
conclusions are limited to file sharing. 
In this study, making the moral justifications of the law salient had no 
measurable effect on perceptions of the social norm, willingness to 
enforce the norm, or intention to share files.  Economists who discuss 
social norms have debated whether there is a need for moral resentment 
for people to be willing to enforce norms.  Scholars such as Mansbridge,140 
and to some extent even Cooter,141 have argued that without internalization 
of values and moral resentment, people will not be willing to enforce 
social norms.  Others scholars, notably Sugden,142 have argued the contrary: 
any violation of expectation would be seen as a justifiable reason for 
social disapproval, regardless of the moral appeal of the law.  The 
findings reported in this Article seem to weigh in favor of those who 
argue that morality is not required for social sanctioning.  The Informal 
Sanction legal frame had a much stronger effect on perceived social 
approval, suggesting that moral resentment is not required.  Furthermore, 
morality had no effect on people’s willingness to sanction others. 
D.  Policy Implications 
These results demonstrate the importance of costs—and especially 
informal sanctions—in copyright law’s ability to change perceptions of 
the prevalence and social desirability of file sharing.  They support the 
view that attaching costs to the announcement of the law enhances the 
law’s ability to change perceptions of the consensus; simply announcing 
the law did not change the prevalence or social desirability of the law.  
 139. For example, Feldman has shown that morality accounted most for the effect 
of trade secret law on the prevalence of knowledge sharing by high tech employees.  See 
Yuval Feldman, The Behavioral Foundations of the Expressive Function of Trade-Secret 
Laws: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation and Consensus (Bar-Ilan Univ., Working 
Paper No. 1-04, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=56224. 
 140. See Jane Mansbridge, Starting with Nothing: On the Impossibility of 
Grounding Norms Solely in Self-Interest, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION, 
supra note 67, at 151 (discussing that it is impossible to base social norms enforcement 
only on self-interest and that considerations of justice are necessary to understand the 
maintenance of norms). 
 141. See Cooter, supra note 98. 
 142. See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1989). 
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Furthermore, there was no evidence of either a crowding out phenomenon, 
in which the salience of deterrence led to some resistance, or a reduction 
of the importance of internal motivation.143  Even if we recognize the 
existence of a separate influence of law on behavior that is not mediated 
by cost, we must not underestimate the importance of costs in the 
expressive function of the law. 
Moving away from the broader discussion of the expressive function 
of the law, the results highlight three implications for file sharing policy.  
First, contrary to the view that pervasive file sharing is explained by 
poor awareness of its illegality, these findings suggest that neither lack 
of awareness nor lack of thought about the law explain the pervasiveness 
of file sharing.  If ignorance of the law explains its prevalence, we would 
expect that simply reminding people about the law would lead to a 
decrease in intention to share files.  Instead, simply informing participants 
about the illegality of file sharing did not influence their intention.  It is 
more plausible that many people are already aware of the unlawful 
nature of sharing copyrighted works, especially given the intense media 
focus on this issue in recent years. 
Second, the results suggest that the private and relatively anonymous 
nature of file sharing is one reason for its popularity.144  Assertions that 
violators’ identities would be exposed influenced both intentions to 
share files and perceptions of file sharing norms most strongly.  The 
prospect of formal punishment also had some effect,145 but the music 
industry may be able to reap deterrent effects simply by threatening to 
publicize the names of especially flagrant violators.  This strategy has 
 143. See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An 
Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1997), for an 
additional illustration of the crowding out effect. 
 144. In fact, Attorney General John Ashcroft discussed this anonymity as the main 
reason for the need for criminal sanction in a statement made on August 25, 2004. 
The execution of today’s warrants disrupted an extensive peer-to-peer network 
suspected of enabling users to traffic illegally in music, films, software and 
published works.  The Department of Justice is committed to enforcing 
intellectual property laws, and we will pursue those who steal copyrighted 
materials even when they try to hide behind the false anonymity of peer-to-
peer networks. 
Department of Justice Brings First Criminal Enforcement Action Against Peer-to-Peer 
Copyright Piracy, 21 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 33 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 145. See Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The 
Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1999) (discussing various 
factors repeat players could consider when deciding whether to litigate against 
individuals). 




practical advantages as well, given the cost inefficiencies of bringing 
lawsuits against individuals with limited resources.  First, the RIAA has 
targeted individuals who engage in a large volume of file sharing, but a 
substantial portion of these heavy users are minors.  As a result, the 
parents of these defendants end up paying for their children’s behavior.  
Another inefficiency is the lawsuits’ divisive nature; because some see 
these lawsuits as a large wealthy industry pursuing hapless young file 
sharers, the industry bears a public relations cost, although the extent of 
the cost is debatable.146  A third inefficiency relates to the pervasiveness 
of the practice.  Individuals may reason that it is worthwhile to continue 
sharing files because the likelihood of being targeted is very low.  
Individuals know that lawsuits are expensive and that the RIAA must 
limit their targets to a very small fraction of the entire population of file 
sharers. Finally, a vast majority of the lawsuits have ended with 
settlements, resulting in less publicity for the RIAA than if they were 
able to take any given case to trial. 
This study indicates the effectiveness of threatening to publicize 
violators’ names.  Even in a widely shared practice like file sharing, the 
potential effect of shaming seems especially promising.  This is contrary 
to some scholars who study shaming147 and argue that it cannot work 
when the practice is prevalent.  These results suggest that people are 
hesitant to be branded as engaging in an illegal activity, even when it 
seems that many others participate.  This approach has obvious limitations 
from both privacy and deterrence perspectives, but when a change in 
norms is required for legal compliance, shaming could be more cost 
effective than litigation. 
Third, it is worth examining the RIAA’s strategy of appealing to 
morality in the form of advertising where popular artists try to explain 
why violating copyright is morally unjustified.  In this experiment, the 
attempt to make morality salient was not effective at either enhancing 
compliance with copyright laws or changing perceptions of others’ file 
sharing behavior and attitudes toward file sharing.  Furthermore, there 
was some suggestion that making morality salient might lead to the 
perception that others are more likely to approve of file sharing.148  This 
somewhat surprising effect, while theoretically supported,149 is troubling 
 146. See Hughes, supra note 24, at 731 (arguing that the public relations downside 
of suing individual users was overestimated). 
 147. See Harel & Klement, supra note 137. 
 148. Note, however, that this difference did not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. 
 149. See Sanderson & Darley, supra note 109.  Significantly, Sanderson and 
Darley’s findings are more complex, taking into account both the type of the offense and 
the type of individual. 
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from a policy perspective.  Circumstances might exist in which appeals to 
morality have an inadvertent effect on the perception of norms.  Of 
course, this experiment’s attempt to make moral considerations salient 
may have simply been too weak to have a measurable effect.  A stronger 
attempt, like using a popular artist to explain how copyright violation 
affects them directly, may have the desired effects. 
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APPENDIX                                                                                                  
DEPENDENT MEASURES 
Note: Headings in brackets are provided here for informational 




1. In 2004, how often will other students download music files using 
the university network? 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Never          Very Often 
          
2. In 2004, how often will students give their friends music files that 
they have downloaded using the university network? 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Never          Very Often 
          
 
3. In 2004, what percentage of other students will download more than 
one song per week using the university network? 
%0-10 10-20 2  20-30  30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100% 
 
[INJUNCTIVE NORMS] 
1. In 2004, will other students think that downloading music files is 
harmless, like playing a game? 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at All         Very Much So 
          
2. In 2004, will other students think that one ought to be extremely 
careful never to download any music file using the university network? 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at All         Very Much So 
          
3. In 2004, how likely is it that your parents would disapprove upon 
hearing that you have downloaded music files using the university 
network? 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at All         Very Much So 
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4. In 2004, how likely is it that a typical professor would disapprove 
upon hearing that you have downloaded music files using the university 
network? 
Unlikely =1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Likely =10  
 
5. In 2004, what proportion of students would disapprove upon 
hearing that you have downloaded music files using the university 
network? 
%0-10    20-30    30-40    40-50    50-60    60-70    70-80    80-90    90-100% 
 
[WILLINGNESS TO PUNISH OTHERS] 
1. How likely would you be to make a remark to a fellow student to 
convey your disapproval upon hearing that she has downloaded music 
files using the university network? 
Unlikely =1  2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9 Likely =10  
 
2. How likely would you be to make a remark to another student to 
convey your disapproval upon hearing that she has shared music files 
using the university network? 
Unlikely =1   2 3 4 5   6   7 8 9 Likely =10  
 
[INTENTION] 
1. In 2004, how likely is it that you will share one music file with your 
fellow students using the university network? 
Unlikely =1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Likely =10     
 
2. It is now 2004. Suppose that your favorite artist has just released a 
new CD.  You heard a few cuts for the first time on the radio and there is 
one song in particular that you really like.  You would really like to have 
the song so you can play it whenever you want, but your budget is tight 
and you can’t justify spending the money on buying the CD.  Just then, 
your friend emails you to say that the song is available unofficially 
online, and sends you the link to a site where an anonymous music fan 
has posted the song.  How likely is it that you would download the song, 
using the university network? 
Unlikely=1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Likely=10 
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3. Out of curiosity, you go to the site and discover that not only is the 
new song from your favorite artist posted, but also posted are hundreds 
of other songs that you would really love to have.  (You figure that this 
anonymous fan must have the same taste in music as you).  How many 
of the songs do you think you would download, using the university 
network? 
None =1  2 3 4   5   6 7 8 9 All =10  
 
[MORALITY] 
1. In 2004, I will NOT feel guilty at all if I download music files using 
the university network. 
Agree =1    2 3 4     5     6 7 8 9  Disagree =10  
 
2. In 2004, I will feel that it is morally wrong for me to download 
music files using the university network. 
Agree =1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Disagree =10  
 
3. In 2004, will you feel that you will have a moral obligation to never 
download music files using the university network? 
                1 
Not at All 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very Much So  
 
[PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF PUNISHMENT] 
In your estimation, how many of the students who disobey this 
regulation by downloading music files using the university network, will 
face any kind of formal sanctions or discipline? 
Few = 1  2 3 4 5 6   7  8  9 Many =10  
 
How likely is it that a typical student, who repeatedly violated this 
regulation by downloading music files, using the university network, 
would face any kind of formal sanctions or discipline? 
Unlikely =1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Likely= 10  
 
In your estimation what percentage of the students who violate this 
regulation by downloading music files will eventually be caught by the 
university authorities? 
  %0-10    10-20   20-30   30-40   40-50   50-60   60-70   70-80   80-90   90-100% 
 
 
